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Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal
Jurisdiction: Essential to Effective
International Relations
I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental principle of international law is that members
of diplomatic missions are shielded from legal process.' This
"shield"--diplomatic immunity-is broadly defined as "the free-
dom from local jurisdiction accorded under international law by the
receiving state to [foreign diplomats and to] the families and ser-
vants of such officers."2 A common misconception is that diplo-
matic privileges and immunities confer a license to commit wrongs. 3
This Comment will demonstrate that diplomatic immunity from
criminal and police jurisdiction, although subject to abuse, does not
entitle diplomats to violate domestic laws, but is, instead, an essen-
tial element of effective international relations.
Specifically, this Comment will trace the doctrine of diplomatic
immunity from its incorporation into United States statutory law in
1790,4 to its uniform international treatment in the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations in 1961,5 and finally to its recent codi-
1. Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Relations Act of
1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 662 (1980) [hereinafter cited as New Regime].
2. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY,
reprinted in Report on Legislative History of the Diplomatic Relations, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
12 (1979).
3. William Macomber, United States ambassador to Turkey, observed that
"[d]iplomatic immunity is not license [to commit a wrong] and those who use it as such
abuse the hospitality which has been extended to them (and) strain rather than improve
relations." Turan, The Devilish Demands of Diplomatic Immunity, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1976,
at 20 (Potomac Section), col. 1; Turan continues: "[tihe hard facts remain that abuse of the
privilege is an all-too-common fact of life." Id See also Gupte, Privilegesfor Diplomats in
U.S. Stir Resentment and May Be Curbed, N.Y. Times, July 18, 1978, § II, at B8, col. 4.
4. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25-27, I Stat. 112, 117-18 (amended by 22 U.S.C.
§§ 252-254 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
5. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. As of December 31, 1977, 127 states had deposited
instruments of ratification of or accession to the Vienna Convention with the United Nations
Secretary General. United Nations Multilateral Treaties: List of Signatures, Ratifications,
Accessions as of 31 Dec. 1977, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. D/ 11 51 (1977). The United
States ratified the Vienna Convention on September 14, 1965; the ratification was deposited
on November 13, 1972; and the Vienna Convention was entered into force in the United
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. ,i:
fication in the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978.6 Special emphasis
will be placed upon the scope of immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion and the class of diplomats who are entitled to receive it. Fi-
nally, the changing nature of diplomatic immunity and the
sanctions which constrain diplomatic representatives to abide by lo-
cal laws will be analyzed.
II. THE THEORIES UNDERLYING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
Any comprehensive analysis of diplomatic immunity must in-
clude a discussion of its underlying theories. Diplomatic immunity
is among the most ancient doctrines of international law.7 Ex-
tending specific rights to representatives of other countries in peri-
ods of peace and war has long been essential to facilitate
international relations.8 Legal scholars have offered several theories
to justify diplomatic privileges and immunities. Most prominent are
the following theories: (1) personal representation; (2) extraterrito-
riality; and (3) functional necessity. 9
A. Personal Representation
The personal representation theory enjoyed its greatest popu-
larity during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.' 0 Under the
personal representation theory, the diplomat assumes the role of the
head of the sending state or of the sovereign power of that state.II
Because the diplomat is the "alter ego" of his ruler,'2 he enjoys the
States on December 13, 1972. The United States Senate's ratification appears at 111 CONG.
REc. 23, 773 (1965)..
6. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 254, 28 U.S.C. § 1364). The Act became effective on December 29, 1978, 90 days
after its enactment on September 30, 1978. For a brief presidential statement on the signing,
see 14 WEEKLY COM. PRES. Doc. 1694 (Oct. 2, 1978).
7. Preface to C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES at vii (1967).
8. Id at 1.
9. Id See also M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 63-194
(1936) (discusses and analyzes in detail the development and status of these three theories).
10. Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and lts Consequences, 19 VA. J. INT'L L.
131, 132 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Consequences].
11. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (6th
ed. 1976).
12. Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), afd, 170 F. 2d 360
(2d Cir. 1948). In Bergman, a French diplomat on his way to his position in Bolivia was
served process while in New York. The court held that the diplomat was entitled to the same
privileges while en route to the country in which he was accredited, as he would have if he
were a diplomatic resident of the United States. The court stated:
[A] foreign minister is immune from the jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the
[Vol. 7:113
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rights and privileges which would be accorded his master by the
receiving state. 13 The rationale for the personal representation the-
ory was best expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon. "The assent of the sovereign to the very im-
portant and extensive exemptions from territorial jurisdiction which
are admitted to attach to foreign ministers, is implied from the con-
siderations that, without such exemption, every sovereign would
hazard his own dignity by employing a public minister abroad."' 4
Personal representation has been criticized, however, as being
"altogether too wide and too fallacious for the business of con-
ducting international business."' 15 The two major criticisms of this
theory are: (1) placing a diplomat entirely beyond the law of a host
state merely because he personifies his sovereign defines too broadly
the scope of that diplomat's rights;' 6 and (2) the concept of "per-
sonal representation" is difficult to apply to modem systems of gov-
ernment. 17 In a monarchy, for example, a diplomat would assume
the role of his king. In a democratic form of government such as the
United States, where sovereign power is divided among executive,
legislative and judicial branches, however, it is difficult to ascertain
exactly whose authority the diplomat represents.' 8
courts in the country to which he is accredited, on the grounds that he is the repre-
sentative, the alter ego, of his sovereign who is, of course, entitled to such immu-
nity, and that subjection to the jurisdiction of the courts would interfere with the
performance of his duties as such minister ...
13. In Holbrook v. Henderson, 4 Sand. Ch. 619, 628 (1839) the court stated that "[tihe
respect rendered the minister is not personal, merely, but is in truth, the respect due from
one sovereign to another .... "
14. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 138 (1812) (a French warship was not subject to admiralty
jurisdiction in the United States, even though the vessel was in United States territorial
waters).
15. RIEFF, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES, AND PRACTICE 26
(1954).
16. Note, Terrorist Kidnapping of Diplomatic Personnel, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 198
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Diplomatic Personnel]. Commentators tend to agree that the pri-
mary purpose of diplomatic immunity is to facilitate international discourse. Therefore, the
scope of such immunity should be narrowly drawn to govern activities promoting this spe-
cific purpose rather than extended in blanket fashion to cover all of the diplomat's activities
in the receiving state. In applying "blanket" immunity to personal representatives of the
sovereign state, however, the personal representation theory fails to limit the scope of diplo-
matic immunity adequately.
17. Id. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 4.
18. Id The personal representation theory assumes that the diplomat personifies the
supreme authority of the sending state. In a democratic state, however, supreme authority is
not vested in one individual or a small group, but rather in separate and distinct branches.
Therefore, this would result in individuals representing various groups of only limited au-
thority in direct contradiction to the theory's premise of the diplomat personifying the
19841
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B. Extraterritoriality
Extraterritoriality is another theory employed during the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries to justify diplomatic immunity.' 9
Under this theory, a diplomat is treated as if he were still living in
the sending state,20 and the premises of the diplomat's mission are
treated as an extension of that state's territory.21 Thus, extraterritori-
ality suggests that a host state may neither enter, nor subject to legal
process, real property held by another state.22 Moreover, a host state
lacks personal jurisdiction over the diplomat and therefore cannot
compel him to appear in its courts. 23 A judicial interpretation of this
theory appeared in Wilson v. Blanco,24 an 1889 New York Supreme
Court case. There, the court stated that the rule of international law
"derives support from the legalfiction that an ambassador is not an
inhabitant of the country to which he is accredited, but of the coun-
try of his origin, and whose sovereign he represents, and within
whose territory he, in contemplation of law, always abides." 25
The theory of extraterritoriality has been widely criticized. 26
supreme authority. "It might now be asked: the ambassador is the personification of whom?"
Id
19. Consequences, supra note 10, at 132.
20. See D. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 47 (1971).
21. Z.H. GROTIUS, 2 DE JURE BELLI ET PAciS 202 (W. Whewell trans. 1853). See also
G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 11, at 81.
22. See G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note II at 80-81. Consider the
situation of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty, the Catholic Primate of Hungary, a fervent anti-
communist, who, to escape imprisonment, resided safely for many years in the United States
embassy in Budapest. Mindszenty Leaves Hungary, Goes to Rome, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1971, at 1, col. 6.
23. Z.H. GROTIUS, supra note 21; see also Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity from Local
Jurisdiction." Its Historical Development under International Law and Application in United
States Practice, 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 173, 175 (1960).
24. 56 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 582, 4 N.Y.S. 714 (1889).
25. Id at 582, 4 N.Y.S. at 714 (emphasis added). Similar judicial interpretations of the
theory are found in The King v. Guerchy, I Black. W. 545, 96 Eng. Rep. 315 (1765) (an
ambassador is not subject to the courts of the country to which he is sent but is believed, by
legal fiction, to still be a resident of his own country); Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487, 517, 139
Eng. Rep. 201, 213 (1854) ("The foundation of the privilege[--exemption from the jurisdic-
tion of the English courts-]is, that the ambassador is supposed to be in the country of his
master"); Attorney General v. Kent, I H. & C. 12, 23, 158 Eng. Rep. 782, 786 (1862) (diplo-
matic immunity is based upon the principle that "an ambassador is deemed to be resident in
the country by which he is accredited").
26. See M. OGDON, JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 94 (1936), where the
author states that the "recent and current trend [as of the 1930's] is conclusively in favor of
repudiating the extra-territorial concept in every form." See also 2 C. HYDE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1266 (2d rev.
ed. 1947) (refers to a "complete abandonment" of the theory); Ambassadors and Consuls -
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First, because the term "extraterritoriality" is subject to many differ-
ent meanings,27 the term itself does not provide adequate guidelines
for determining the scope and limits of diplomatic privileges and
immunities.28 Moreover, strict application of this theory could result
in dangerous consequences because it presupposes a grant of unlim-
ited privileges and immunities which would transcend those ordina-
rily extended to diplomats.29 Finally, extraterritoriality assumes that
diplomatic immunity is based upon the absolute independence of na-
tions when, in fact, the question of immunity arises only because
nations are interdependent in the area of international relations.30
C Functional Necessity
Courts and legal theorists recently have begun to temper the
theories of personal representation and extraterritoriality because
they define the scope of immunities accorded diplomats too
broadly. 3' "Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immu-
nities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient per-
formance of the functions of diplomatic missions," 32 the current
justification for diplomatic immunity is based upon the theory of
functional necessity.33 Under this theory, a diplomat can operate ef-
fectively only if given enough liberty to conduct the business with
which he is charged. 34 Practical necessity dictates that the diplo-
Pripileges, Immunities and Disabilities, 25 CH.[-]KENT L. REV. 329, 333 (1947) (suggests that
the theory is "outmoded and, logically, no longer applicable.").
27. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 12 (various meanings of the word are listed and
analyzed).
28. M. OGDON, supra note 26, at 102-03. Because the term "extraterritoriality" does
not provide the actual reasons for determining rights and duties, it is of little value as a
guideline in determining the scope and limits of diplomatic privileges and immunities.
29. Id Normally, immunities are extended to diplomats based upon their official rank
and status. In treating the diplomat as a resident of the sending state, the host state has no
jurisdictional authority over him whatsoever. This theory, therefore, has the effect of grant-
ing the same immunities to all diplomats regardless of their official positions. D. MICHAELS,
supra note 20, at 49 n.63.
30. Diplomatic Personnel, supra note 16, at 198. The major premise for extending privi-
leges and immunities to diplomats is that these privileges and immunities are of vital impor-
tance in facilitating relations between nations. The theory of extraterritoriality, however, is
expressed as an independence from local authority and thus ignores this interdependence
between the nations. D. MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 49.
31. See generally D. MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 49.
32. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, Preamble, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
33. D. MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 49.
34. Note, The Diplomatic Relations Act: The United States Protects Its Own, 5 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 379, 384 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S Protects Its Own].
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matic agent be permitted to perform his duties without fear of civil
or criminal prosecution in the country to which he is accredited. 35
The reason for recognizing such a theory is best summarized by
Sir Cecil Hurst:
The writers of textbooks have dealt at great length with the
question why immunities are given to diplomatic representatives,
and the nature of the obligation upon States to recognise such
immunities. In reality the matter is very simple. The privileges
and immunities are founded on the necessities of the case. They
are essential to the maintenance of international relations. On no
other basis than that of exemption from subjection to the local
jurisdiction would sovereign States have been willing in times
past or today to send their representatives to the headquarters of
another State. On no other terms would it have been possible for
foreign diplomatic representatives to fulfil the tasks allotted to
them.36
The functional necessity theory is not without criticism. The
theory has been attacked as being too vague because it fails to indi-
cate the limits to which immunities essential to "the accepted prac-
tice of diplomacy" are to be extended or, for that matter, what the
accepted practice of diplomacy is.37 Further, to hold that diplomats
require immunity to function effectively implies that diplomats reg-
ularly engage in activities that are injurious or illegal.38 Neverthe-
less, the functional necessity theory "seems less vague than other
theories that have been put forward and, also, more soundly based
on reality. ' 39 For example, the personal representation and extrater-
ritoriality theories extend blanket immunity to the individual diplo-
mat without any regard to the activities he is to perform within the
diplomatic mission. The functional necessity theory, on the other
hand, moves the emphasis from the individual and focuses instead
on the functions of the diplomat. This is a realistic effort to extend
only the immunity necessary to perform the diplomatic mission.
35. D. MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 21.
36. C. HURST, INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 174 (1950) (lecture delivered
at the Academy of International Law in 1926).
37. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 22.
38. New Regime, supra note 1, at 670.
39. Dolomatic Personnel, supra note 16, at 199-200 n.50.
[Vol. 7:113
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY As
APPLIED IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The 1790 Statute
At international common law, diplomatic agents enjoyed nu-
merous privileges and substantial immunity from the receiving
state's jurisdiction.40 In the early twentieth century, the doctrine of
diplomatic immunity was so widespread that in 1906 United States
Secretary of State Elihu Root declared that "the immunities of dip-
lomatic agents exist by virtue of the law of nations . . . [and for
such] universally accepted principles no authority need be cited.
'" 4 1
Nevertheless, in the United States, diplomatic immunity has been
codified since 1790.
The United States, recognizing diplomatic immunity as essen-
tial to international discourse, codified and expanded upon the ex-
isting common law when the First Congress passed the Act of April
30, 1790.42 From its enactment in 1790 to its repeal in 1978 with the
passage of the Diplomatic Relations Act,43 this statute was the sole
basis for diplomatic privileges and immunities in the United
States. 4
The 1790 Statute adopted the rule of Respublica v. De
Longchamps,45 which stated that diplomatic immunity is virtually
absolute.46 In De Longchamps, the earliest diplomatic immunity
40. See New Regime, supra note 1, at 662-63.
41. Letter from United States Secretary of State Elihu Root to the Secretary of Com-
merce and Labor, Mar. 16, 1906, reprinted in 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 513 (1942).
42. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25-27, 1 Stat. 112. Section 25 provides:
[I]f any writ or process shall at any time hereafter be sued forth or prosecuted by
any person or persons, in any of the courts of the United States, or in any of the
courts of a particular state, or by any judge or justice therein respectively, whereby
the person of any ambassador or other public minister of any foreign prince or
state, authorized and received as such by the President of the United States, or any
domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or other public minister,
may be arrested or imprisoned, or his or their goods or chattels be distrained,
seized, or attached, such writ or process shall be deemed and adjudged to be utterly
null and void to all intents, construction and purposes whatsoever.
43. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808, 808 (1978).
44. Note, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities-The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978:
A Congressional Response to a Vexing Problem, 22 How. L.J. 119, 121 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Diplomatic Privileges].
45. I U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784). In DeLongchamps, a Pennsylvania resident committed a
battery against the Secretary of the French Legation by striking the Secretary's cane. As a
result of this battery, the Secretary beat the resident "with great severity" and the resident
was prosecuted for violating the law of nations. Id at 111-12.
46. 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976) (repealed 1978). Section 252 provides that "any ambassador
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case in the United States, the Supreme Court held that when a dip-
lomat is attacked in any way, either through legal process or
through more direct means, "his freedom of conduct is taken away,
[and] the business of his Sovereign cannot be transacted . . .- 4
Further, the statute made it a crime punishable by fine and impris-
onment for up to three years to bring suit against a diplomat.
48
The absolute immunity guaranteed by the 1790 Statute was re-
peatedly accepted by the courts as a rational principle of interna-
tional law. In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,49 Chief Justice
Marshall observed in dicta that a diplomat would be unable to func-
tion as the representative of his sending state if he was subject to
continued appearances in the receiving state's courts.50 More re-
cently, two federal district courts have gone so far as to hold that
requiring a diplomat to answer to private suits is a form of coer-
cion 5' and an unjustifiable interference with the performance of his
functions.52
Complete immunity, as guaranteed by the 1790 Statute, re-
quired proper registration with the United States Department of
State.5 3 The State Department further extended the coverage of the
1790 Statute to administrative and technical employees of the diplo-
matic mission.54 Although the statute itself did not expressly include
such personnel, the State Department considered them implicitly
covered by the term "domestic" in the statute.55 The State Depart-
ment's extension of immunity was rarely challenged because poten-
tial plaintiffs were reluctant to test the proper scope of diplomatic
or public minister or any foreign prince of State, authorized and received as such by the
President is absolutely immune from arrest, imprisonment, or seizure of his property."
47. DeLongehamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) at 117.
48. 22 U.S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). For example, in Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upheld the refusal of a United States Marshal to serve a summons on the Tunisian ambassa-
dor. Chief Judge Bazelon stated that "although courts will not allow a Marshal to avoid his
duty to serve process merely because he notices the availability of a defense to suit, they
must protect him if service would violate international law and might subject him to the
criminal law of the United States." Id at 979.
49. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 111 (1812).
50. Id. at 138.
51. See Arcaya v. Paez, 145 F. Supp. 464, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
52. Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW: FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 73, comment (i) (1965).
54. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
193, 194 (1976) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF STATE (1976)].
55. Id.
[Vol. 7:113
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immunity when the penalty for being wrong was three years of
imprisonment.
5 6
Under the 1790 Statute, the victim of a diplomat's civil or crim-
inal wrong was unable to obtain legal relief in the United States.
5 7
This situation was exacerbated by the State Department's extension
of blanket immunity to diplomats' families, staff and servants.5 8 As
the number of diplomatic personnel in the United States increased,
diplomatic abuse of local laws, especially in the area of traffic viola-
tions,5 9 became more prevalent. The increased abuses by diplomats
created a tremendous public outcry and forced the State Depart-
ment to re-evaluate its policy of blanket immunity.6
0
B. The 1969 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
In addition to the United States' codification of diplomatic im-
munity in 1790, many other nations had their own laws governing
diplomatic immunity.6' During the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, however, no formal international codification of diplomatic
immunity existed.
As early as 1815, attempts began to formulate a comprehensive
policy of diplomatic immunity, 62 but international codification of
diplomatic law did not become a reality until the twentieth century.
56. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 26, 1 Stat. 112, 118 (as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 253
(1976) (repealed 1978)). Section 26 provided:
[11n case any person or persons shall sue forth or prosecute any such writ or pro-
cess, such person or persons, and all attorneys or solicitors prosecuting or soliciting
in such case, and all officers executing any such writ or process, being thereof con-
victed, shall be deemed violators of the laws of nations, and disturbers of the public
repose, and imprisoned not exceeding three years, and fined at the discretion of the
court.
Id
57. Diplomatic Privileges, supra note 44, at 121.
58. DEP'T OF STATE (1976), supra note 54, at 193-94.
59. S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
60. Id
61. See United Nations Legislative Series, II Laws and Regulations Regarding Diplo-
matic and Consular Privileges and Immunities, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/Ser.B 7 (1958).
62. Garreton, The Immunities of Representatives of Foreign States, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
67, 69 (1966).
The Vienna Convention is the first comprehensive, truly international convention
on diplomatic immunities. An earlier convention relating to privileges and immu-
nities was signed at the Sixth International Conference of American States, held in
Havana, Cuba in 1928, but only American States were represented. The Congress
of Vienna in 1815 formulated international law on diplomatic immunity, but only
as it pertained to heads of mission. The document was signed by only eight Euro-
pean powers.
C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 273.
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In 1952, at the request of the United Nations, the International Law
Commission studied the possibility of creating a uniform standard
for diplomatic representatives. In 1958, the Commission submitted
draft articles to a conference of eighty-one nations meeting in Vi-
enna.63 The final result was the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961.64
The Convention attempted to clarify and codify the existing in-
ternational common law and practice of diplomatic relations among
nations. 65 Twelve of the fifty-three articles of the Convention dealt
directly with personal immunity.66 These twelve articles established
the various categories of diplomats protected as well as the scope of
that protection. For example, Article 37 classified members of the
diplomatic mission into four categories receiving decreasing degrees
of immunity:67 (1) the diplomat's family; (2) the administrative and
technical staff; (3) the service staff;68 and (4) private servants. 69
A comparison of the immunities enumerated in the 1790 Stat-
ute and those provided by the Convention reveals several differ-
ences. First, diplomatic agents under the statute are entitled to full
civil and criminal immunity from legal process in the United
States.70 Under the Convention, diplomatic agents have full immu-
nity from criminal prosecution by the host state, but have three ex-
63. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.- Hearing before the Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965) (statement of Leonard C.
Mecker).
64. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227 T.I.A.S
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. As an indication of its acceptance in the international commu-
nity, 112 nations became parties to the Vienna Convention within ten years after its entry
into force. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 1 (1976).
65. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings and Markup before the Subcomm. on
Internal Operations of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 96
(1977) (statement of Burno Ristau, Dep't of Justice).
66. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 29-40, 23 U.S.T.
3229, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
67. Id art. 37.
68. Id art. 1(d), (0, (g). Article I of the Convention provides in pertinent part:
(d) the "members of the diplomatic stall" are the members of the staff of the mis-
sion having diplomatic rank;
(f) the "members of the administrative and technical stair' are the members of the
staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the
mission. ...
Id art. l(d), (0.
69. Id art. 1(h).
70. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 25-27, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18 (amended by 22 U.S.C.
§§ 252-254 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
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ceptions to full civil immunity.7 1 Second, administrative and
technical staffs are granted full civil and criminal immunity under
the statute. Under the Convention, they are granted complete crim-
inal immunity, but their civil immunity is limited only to acts per-
formed within the scope of their official duties. 72 Third, members of
the service staff enjoy full civil and criminal immunity under the
statute, but under the Convention they are entitled to civil and crim-
inal immunity only to the extent of their official acts.73 Fourth, pri-
vate servants are granted blanket immunity under the statute, but
are denied immunity under the Convention, with the notable excep-
tion of receiving those immunities extended by the host state.74 Fi-
nally, family members of both diplomatic agents and administrative
staff enjoy the same immunities as do the respective personnel under
the Convention. 75
Inconsistencies between the Vienna Convention and the 1790
Statute delayed the United States' implementation of the Conven-
tion's narrower immunity provisions. 76 Although the United States
signed the Convention in 1961, it was not ratified by the United
States Senate until 1965, 77 and did not enter into force of law until
1972.78 At that time, the State Department still granted full immu-
nity under the 1790 Statute. 79 The long delay between the signing of
the Vienna Convention and its ratification resulted from Congress'
attempt to enact new legislation repealing the 1790 Statute before
the Convention was ratified . ° Congress deemed this repeal neces-
71. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. These exceptions are: (1) an action relating to private
immovable property in the local jurisdiction; (2) an action relating to succession in which the
diplonatic agent is involved as executor or heir; and (3) an action relating to any profes-
sional or commercial activity outside the scope of the diplomat's official functions. Id
72. Id art. 37(2).
73. Id. art. 37(3).
74. Id art. 37(4).
75. Id art. 37(I). Since service staff enjoyed immunity only as to official acts, family
members of these personnel in effect enjoyed no immunities. See id
76. Consequences, supra note 10, at 139-40.
77. 111 CONG. REC. 22935 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1965).
78. 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 443 (1972).
79. In Senate hearings on the Diplomatic Relations Act, a State Department spokes-
man explained that "at the time the Vienna Convention was ratified the executive depart-
ment [sic] determined that the 1790 statute was not superseded." Diplomatic Immunity
Legislation.- Hearing on H.RA 7819 before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 23 (1978) (remarks of Horace Shamwell, Dep't of State).
80. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1964 (1974).
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sary to conform the international standards of the Vienna Conven-
tion to the domestic standards of diplomatic immunity.81
C. The Dilomatic Relations Act of 1978
In 1978, through the Diplomatic Relations Act, 82 Congress re-
pealed the 1790 Statute and implemented relevant provisions of the
Vienna Convention as the expression of United States law on diplo-
matic immunity.83 The Act was designed to "complement" the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations84 and does not deal with
the full range of diplomatic relations included in the Convention. 85
The more pertinent provisions of the Act include:
(1) Establishment of the Convention's privileges and immuni-
ties as the sole expression of United States law on the
subject; 8
6
(2) Extension of the Convention's provisions to members of
diplomatic missions of sending States which had not rati-
fied the Convention;87
(3) Presidential authorization to extend more favorable or less
favorable treatment than was provided under the
Convention;8
8
(4) Dismissal of actions against individuals entitled to immu-
nity under either the Convention or the Act;89
81. Id.
82. Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1978), 28
U.S.C. § 1364 (1978)).
83. Id. at 808-10.
84. Id at 808.
85. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings on HR. 1536, HR. 6133, and HR.
3841 before the Subcomm. on Internal Operations ofthe House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 120 (1977) (statement of Virginia Schlundt, subcommittee staff).
86. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
87. Id. § 3(b) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1978)). "Since the Vienna
Convention is universally accepted as a codification of binding customary international law
on the subject, it is probable to assume that [these]. . . privileges and immunities would be
extended to nonsignatory nations." DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF STATE (1977)].
88. Diplomatic Relations Act § 4 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1982)):
The President may, on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms and condi-
tions as he may determine, specify privileges and immunities for the mission, mem-
bers of the mission, their families, and the diplomatic couriers which result in more
favorable treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna
Convention.
Id
89. Id. § 5 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1978)):
Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immu-
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(5) Repeal of the United States Supreme Court's exclusive ju-
risdiction over suits involving diplomats and establishment
of original jurisdiction in federal district courts;90 and
(6) Implementation of mandatory insurance and direct action
provisions.9 1
The most influential and innovative provisions of the Act are
the mandatory insurance and direct action provisions which focus
on the immunity of the diplomat from vehicular accident liability. 92
Because traffic accidents and resulting injuries constitute the largest
number of complaints regarding the misuses of diplomatic immu-
nity,93 the mandatory insurance and direct action requirements were
included to address these abuses. Section 6 of the Act requires diplo-
mats to obtain mandatory liability insurance.94 This section further
provides that "[t]he President shall, by regulation, establish liability
insurance requirements." 95 This authority was delegated to the State
Department, 96 which has proposed several regulations, 97 including
suggested minimum limits on liability coverage. 98 Nevertheless, the
nity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, under section 254(b) or 254(c) of this Act, or under any
other laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed.
Such immunity may be established upon motion or suggestion by or on behalf of
the individual, or as otherwise permitted by law or applicable rules of procedure.
Id.
90. Id. § 8 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1978)). The exclusive jurisdiction clause was
codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1978), but has never been successfully invoked in its 180
years of existence. Further, there is only one known instance where an attempt was made to
bring an original action in the Supreme Court against a foreign ambassador or his servant.
Founding Church of Scientology v. Lord Cramer, 404 U.S. 933 (1971) (motion for leave to
file bill of complaint denied); DEP'T OF STATE (1977), supra note 87, at 267.
91. Diplomatic Relations Act § 6 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 254(e) (1983)). Compared
with other members of the international community, the United States was late in establish-
ing compulsory insurance for diplomats and in creating a right of direct action against insur-
ers. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, S. REP. No. 1108,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1978).
92. Increased media attention to the plight of persons injured in accidents with "im-
mune" foreign diplomats contributed greatly to the passage of the Act. 124 CONG. REC. S13,
695-97 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1978) (remarks of Senators Mathias, Sarbanes and Thurmond).
93. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1979).
94. Diplomatic Relations Act § 6 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 254(e) (1978)).
95. Id.
96. Exec. Order No. 12,101, 43 Fed. Reg. 54,195 (1978).
97. 43 Fed. Reg. 57,159 (1978) (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 151 (1978)).
98. Id at 57,160 (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 151.5 (1978)). The regulations propose a mini-
mum liability of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per incident for bodily injury, and $50,000
per incident for property damage, but permit the receiving state to make the final determina-
tion. Id
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State Department allows the receiving state to make the final deter-
mination of minimum coverage.99 The insurance coverage require-
ments of most states are less than those recommended by the State
Department. 100
In an attempt to guarantee mandatory insurance recovery, sec-
tion 7 of the Act creates a federal remedy allowing an injured party
to proceed directly against a diplomat's insurer.' 0' Under the direct
action provision, the insurance company may not offer the diplo-
matic immunity of its insured as a defense. 0 2 Absent such a provi-
sion, an insurer would receive a windfall since it could collect
premiums while being shielded from liability. 0 3
99. Id
100. Compare the mandatory coverage in New York and the District of Columbia
where the limit is $20,000 per incident for bodily injury, and only $5,000 for property dam-
age. N.Y. INS. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-43 (1973 & Supp.
1978).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1364(a)-(b) (Supp. 1984).
(a) The district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction, without re-
gard to the amount in controversy, of any civil action commenced by any person
against an insurer who by contract has insured an individual, who is a member of a
mission [as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations] or a mem-
ber of the family of such a member of a mission . . . against liability for personal
injury, death, or damage to property.
(b) Any direct action brought against an insurer under subsection (a) shall be tried
without a jury, but shall not be subject to the defense that the insured is immune
from suit, that the insured is an indispensable party, or in the absence of fraud or
collusion, that the insured has violated a term of the contract unless the contract
was cancelled before the claim arose.
Id
The constitutionality of a federal direct action statute was raised in congressional hear-
ings. Claims Against Persons Entitled to Diplomatic Immunity. Hearings on H.R. 7679 before
the House Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Thomas Kindness, Ohio). The
constitutional objections were overcome when the Supreme Court upheld a state direct ac-
tion law in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), against
equal protection, due process and contract clause challenges.
102. Compare Dickinson v. Del Solar, [1930] I K.B. 376, 380, 142 L.T.R. (n.s.) 66, 67
(1930), an early English case in which an insurance company attempted to shield itself from
liability by contending that the diplomatic immunity status of the insured should extend to
the insurer. Had the Minister not waived the diplomatic agent's immunity, the court was
willing to permit such an extension, thereby making the insurance coverage a fiction. See
also Windsor v. State Farm Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 342, 343 (D.D.C. 1978).
103. Diplomatic Immunity Legislation: Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1980) (statement of Richard Gookin, Deputy Chief of Pro-
tocol); see also Diplomatic Immunity. Hearing on S. 476, S. 477, S. 1256, S. 1257 and H.R.
7819 before the Subcomm. on Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 42-45 (1978) (exchange between Senator Met-
zenbaum and Stacy L. Williams, asst. vice-president and associated legislative counsel,
Gov't Employees Ins. Co.).
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The mandatory insurance and direct action provisions, how-
ever, have been criticized for four major reasons. First, the Act is
"not retroactive and some of the victims of past accidents remain
uncompensated."' Second, the prospective minimum liability cov-
erage standards required by the individual states are often inade-
quate to compensate injured victims fairly. 05 Third, and closely
related to the second criticism, the accident victim who sustains in-
juries greater than the amount of the diplomat's insurance coverage
is left without any additional means of recovery, 10 6 because, unlike
most citizens, the diplomat is not subject to a lawsuit beyond the
effective insurance coverage. 0 7 Finally, the direct action provision
makes diplomats undesirable policyholders and United States insur-
ance companies reluctant to insure them.10 8
III. IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
A recurring theme throughout the history of diplomatic immu-
nity is the immunity diplomatic personnel enjoy from criminal pros-
ecution in the host state. 0 9 This universal rule of immunity is stated
in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention: "A diplomatic agent
shall enjoy [absolute] immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State.""o This became law in the United States with the
passage of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978."' l
104. Comment, The Effect of the Diplomatic Relations Act, I I CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 354,
368 (1981).
105. See supra notes 98-100.
106. 22 C.F.R. § 151.9 (1978).
107. Id.
108. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Amending Title 28, United States Code, to Provide
for Action Against Insurers on Claims Against Persons Entitled to Diplomatic Immunity,
J.R.R.N. 1410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978). The insurance spokesmen contended that:
[T]he entire issue of providing just compensation to innocent victims of diplomatic
negligence is a social and governmental problem. It is not one that should be uni-
laterally imposed on the private insurance industry. Should both the Diplomatic
Relations Act and the direct action legislation become law, it will effectively close
the voluntary market on liability insurance to diplomats in the United States.
109. See U.S Protects Its Own, supra note 34, at 388.
110. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31(1), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. The host state, however, may declare a diplomat
to be persona non grata (a person not warranting immunity) for any reason. Id art. 9; 1.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (2d ed. 1973). For a definition
of persona non grata, see infra note 174.
11i. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
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A. Criminal and Police Jurisdiction
Most commentators 1 2 as well as most courts" 3 support abso-
lute immunity from criminal prosecution. Many commentators
contend that under both the theory and practice of international
law, diplomatic agents may not be tried or punished by local courts
for committing a crime.,1 14 Criminal immunity derives support from
the functional necessity theory's goal of maintaining public order
and preserving free and uninterrupted relations among nations."15
Immunity from the jurisdiction of local police is a traditional
right inherent in a diplomat's immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion."I6 This right is articulated in a District of Columbia Police De-
partmental Order which states that "the person entitled to such
immunity may not be detained or arrested or subjected to a body
search, may not be prosecuted and may not be required to give evi-
dence as a witness .... ,117 This statement does not mean, how-
ever, that diplomats are exempt from local police regulations.
Article 41, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention incorporates this
idea by declaring that "[wlithout prejudice to their privileges and
immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and
immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving
State."'l1
Nevertheless, abuse by diplomats of local laws and regulations
is not uncommon, especially infractions of municipal traffic ordi-
nances. Traffic violations, such as speeding, running stop signs and
112. See E. SATOW, A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 181 (N. Bland ed. 1957) (im-
munity extends to any "ordinary crime"); C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 469 (1948)
(public ministers are "completely immune" from criminal prosecution).
113. United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no immunity was
granted because those charged with espionage were not duly authorized as "diplomats"); see
also Rex v. A.B., [1941] 1 K.B. 454 (1941) (diplomatic representative of another country,
duly authorized by his own government, was granted immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
the host state). In a 1978 espionage case, Vietnam's ambassador to the United Nations,
Dink Ba Thi, was ordered to leave the United States while his accomplice, a United States
citizen, was convicted as a spy and sentenced to five years imprisonment. NEWSWEEK, Feb.
13, 1978, at 25.
114. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 110, at 343; I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, PEACE
790 (Lauterpracht 8th ed. 1955).
115. D. MICHAELS, supra note 20, at 50.
116. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 89.
117. Departmental Order, Dist. of Columbia, Metropolitan Police Department, Diplo-
matic Immunity, Gen. Order 308, No. 12 (Dec. 28, 1979).
118. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 41, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.1.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
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not paying parking tickets present special enforcement problems.' 19
The magnitude of this problem is vividly illustrated in New York
and Washington, D.C., the two cities with the largest diplomatic
populations. United Nations officials in New York City accounted
for 250,000 parking tickets, few of which have been paid. 120 During
1976, fewer than one-fifth of 52,830 parking tickets issued to
automobiles bearing diplomatic plates in Washington, D.C., were
paid.' 2' Because most jurisdictions within the United States classify
traffic violations as criminal offenses, 122 diplomats continue to es-
cape prosecution for these violations under the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act, which grants criminal immunity to most categories of
diplomatic personnel. 2 3 The question remaining, therefore, is
which categories of diplomats are protected from criminal
prosecution?
B Categories of Diplomats Protected under the Dplomatic
Relations Act
Of the four major categories of the "diplomatic mission," only
two-diplomatic agents, and administrative and technical staff-are
granted complete immunity from criminal prosecution. 24 Family
members of these two groups also enjoy these immunities. 125 Func-
tional necessity dictates that those privileges and immunities
granted to the diplomatic agent be extended to his family.
26
119. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities- Hearings and Markup before the Subcomm.
on Internal Operations ofthe House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
40-41 (1977) (statement of Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, a Delegate in Congress from the Dis-
trict of Columbia) [hereinafter cited as Hearings and Markup].
120. These unpaid tickets amounted to $5 million. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1978, at 50. In
Washington, D.C., between March, 1976, and February, 1977, there were a total of 37,905
unpaid diplomatic parking tickets at an unredeemed value of $1,070,730. Hearings and
Markup, supra note 119, at 49 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, New York).
121. Hearings and Markup, supra note 119, at 40-41.
122. See Diplomatic Immunity: Hearings before the Senate Subcomm. of the Comm. of
the Judiciary on Citizens and Shareholders'Rights and Remedies, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126-39
(1978). It should be noted that in the District of Columbia, regulations proscribing minor
traffic violations have been transferred from the criminal code to the civil code, and more
vigorous enforcement against diplomats with limited civil liablity is expected. Effective Jan-
uary 29, 1979, the District of Columbia decriminalized parking violations. Bowman, Many
Embassy Aides To Lose Parking Immunity, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1979, at C-I, col. 1.
123. 22 U.S.C. § 254(d) (1982).
124. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, arts. 31(1) & 37(2), 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
125. Id art. 37(1). This Comment limits discussion to diplomatic agents and their
families.
126. O'Keefe, Privileges and Immunities of the Diplomatic Family, 25 INT'L & COMP.
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The general rule that diplomatic agents (ambassadors and min-
isters) are exempt from criminal prosecution in the courts of the
country to which they are accredited has not been seriously con-
tested. 27 However, the immunities granted to the diplomat's family,
and the rationale for granting such immunities, have both been
challenged.
The immunity provisions of the Vienna Convention applicable
to a diplomat's family were incorporated into the Diplomatic Rela-
tions Act of 1978.128 Article 37, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Conven-
tion states that "[tihe members of the family of a diplomatic agent
forming part of the household shall, if they are not nationals of the
receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Ar-
ticles 29 to 36."129 Article 37 immunity is therefore contingent upon
membership in the "family" and inclusion as part of the "house-
hold." Interpretation of these terms, however, has produced multifa-
rious definitions. The international view is that "family" includes at
least spouses, dependent parties and children of different age
groups, 130 while "household" includes private servants who are not
nationals of the receiving state but who live under the same roof.'13
The United States interpretation of these terms, however, is more
specific:
[Tlhe wife of a diplomatic agent, his minor children, and perhaps
his children that are full-time college students or who are totally
dependent on him, are entitled to diplomatic immunity ....
Other cases, e.g. unmarried adult daughters, dependent parents,
and sisters acting as official hostesses, are decided on the basis of
the facts in the particular situation and the practice in the receiv-
L.Q. 329, 332-33 (1976); I YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 162 (1958)
("Unless the members of a diplomatic agent's family enjoyed immunity, pressure could be
brought to bear upon the diplomatic agent through his family .... ").
127. See Vulcan Iron Works, Inc. v. Polish Am. Mach. Corp., 472 F. Supp. 77, 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[t]he immunity of representatives of foreign nations ... from criminal
...jurisdiction has long been a precept of international law").
128. Diplomatic Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978).
129. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37(1), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (emphasis added). Article 37 represents the mini-
mum privileges and immunities a state is obliged to grant to a diplomatic family. The state
may exceed these standards by agreement with the sending state if it so desires. Articles 29
through 36 state that a diplomat's family may never be subjected to legal process except in
cases involving real property, successions, or professional or commercial activity. See id art.
31(1).
130. DEP'T OF STATE (1977), supra note 87, at 272.
131. I YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 123 (1957).
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ing state. 132
Extending immunity to the diplomat's wife is illustrated in two
New York cases: Friedberg v. Santa Cruz'33 and People v. Von Ot-
ter. 134 Both cases involved suits for the negligent operation of motor
vehicles against the wives of diplomatic agents. The defendant-
wives pled the affirmative defense of absolute and unconditional im-
munity. The courts held for the defendants by extending the hus-
bands' diplomatic immunities, as State Department diplomatic
agents, to the wives as a matter of federal law.1
5
Children of foreign ambassadors often abuse the immunities
afforded to them as members of a diplomat's family. Such abuses
are illustrated by the following incidents involving serious traffic vi-
olations. The first incident involved the twenty-one year old son of
the Irish ambassador to the United States, John J. Hearne.136 Young
Hearne was charged with homicide when his car struck and killed a
domestic worker as she was crossing the street. 37 The charge was
dropped when diplomatic immunity was invoked. 138 The other two
incidents involved sons of ambassadors to the United States from
Paraguay and Pakistan. 39 Both situations involved charges of reck-
less driving, but neither one resulted in criminal prosecution be-
cause diplomatic immunity was invoked. In one instance the police
chief threatened to assign a three-man force to arrest the son and
bring him before a judge "to show that traffic laws were not to be
'sneezed at.' "140 The State Department, however, intervened and
cancelled the "marching orders" because the ambassador's immu-
nity extended to his son.' 4'
The foregoing examples demonstrate that a diplomat's immu-
nity from criminal prosecution extends to the diplomat's immediate
family. Further, Article 39(1) of the Convention states that those
family members extended such immunities "enjoy them from the
132. 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (1963).
133. 193 Misc. 599, 86 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1949).
134. 202 Misc. 901, 114 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1952).
135. Friedberg, 193 Misc. at 600, 86 N.Y.S.2d at 370; Von Otter, 202 Misc. at 901, 114
N.Y.S.2d at 297. See 22 U.S.C. § 1251 (1979) (these cases are rarely adjudicated on their
merits).
136. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 187.
137. Id
138. Id
139. Id at 188.
140. Id at 189.
141. Id
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moment [the diplomat] enters the territory of the receiving State on
proceeding to take up his post."' 42 Moreover, these immunities do
not immediately cease to exist when the family member is no longer
"part of the household."'' 43 If for some reason the diplomat's immu-
nities cease (e.g., the diplomat dies at his post or is recalled by the
sending state), "the members of his family shall continue to enjoy
the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled until the
[expiration] of a reasonable period in which to leave the country." 44
While extending immunity to family members of diplomatic
agents is explicit within both the Vienna Convention and Diplo-
matic Relations Act, extending such immunity to private servants in
the "household" is an entirely different matter. According to the
Act, a private servant is prohibited from invoking the immunity of
the diplomat for whom he or she works. 145 Article 37(4) states that
private servants "may enjoy privileges and immunities only to the
extent admitted by the receiving State."'146 Nevertheless, in United
States v. Santizo147 and United States v. Ruiz,148 criminal cases de-
cided after the adoption of the Vienna Convention, private servants
attempted to shield themselves from criminal liability by asserting
the immunity of their diplomatic employer. Both attempts were
unsuccessful.
In Santizo,149 one defendant, Ruiz, was a chauffeur to the am-
bassador of Peru and the husband of the other defendant, Santizo.
Santizo was convicted of criminal abortion, while Ruiz was acquit-
ted of being an accessory to the crime. Santizo moved for a new
trial contending that she and her husband, as private servants of the
ambassador, were entitled to diplomatic immunity from criminal
142. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 39(1), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
143. O'Keefe, supra note 126, at 350 (citing arts. 10(l)(b), 39(I) & 39(2)). The question
remains as to who exactly is included as "part of the household." See M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 132, at 262.
144. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 39(3), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
145. Id. art. 37(4).
146. Id Article 37(4) further states that "the receiving State must exercise its jurisidic-
tion over [private servants in the household] in such a manner as not to interfere unduly
with the performance of the functions of the mission."
147. No. C-971-63 (D.C. 1963), as reported in Harris, Diplomatic Privileges and Immuni-
fies: A New Regime Is Soon To Be Adopted by the United States, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 98, 111
(1968).
148. No. 10150-65 (D.C. 1965), as discussed in id. at 112-13.
149. See supra note 147.
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prosecution. The district court denied her motion. 50 A similar im-
munity claim was raised in United States v. Ruiz,I5' where the de-
fendant was charged with larceny. The district court held that the
servant would have been entitled to diplomatic immunity if the Pe-
ruvian ambassador had asserted it on the servant's behalf. The am-
bassador did not assert such immunity, however, and the defendant
was subsequently convicted. 52 These cases indicate that the courts
are reluctant to extend immunity to private servants within the dip-
lomat's "household." Nevertheless, the Ruiz court's failure to estab-
lish an absolute rule against immunity for servants leaves the door
open for future claims. Thus, extending these immunities to the pri-
vate servants within the household requires case-by-case analysis
until an absolute rule is established.
C Sanctions Imposed to Prevent Abuses
Although the normal procedures and sanctions against those
who break local laws cannot be enforced against diplomats, a
number of safeguards exist which are designed to deter diplomatic
representatives from breaking local laws. 5 3 The sending state's re-
tention of jurisdiction over its own diplomats serves as one such
safeguard. 54 With this safeguard, an injured party is entitled to sue
a diplomat in the courts of the sending state where the diplomat
does not enjoy immunity.55 In Dickinson v. Del Solar,56 Lord
Hewart stated that "[elven if execution could not issue in this coun-
try while Mr. Del Solar remains a diplomatic agent, presumably it
might issue if he ceased to be a privileged person, and the judgment
might also be the foundation of proceedings against him in [his
sending state] at any time.' 157 Nevertheless, this safeguard is rarely
used in practice.158
Another safeguard available is the waiver of diplomatic immu-
150. See Harris, supra note 147, at 111-12 (note that Santizo was not a diplomatic em-
ployee herself).
151. See supra note 148, at 112 (Ruiz was the defendant in both of these suits).
152. Id
153. See generally Hill, Sanctions Constraining Diplomatic Representatives To Abide by
the Local Law, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 252, 253-68 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Sanctions Con-
straining Dplomats (discusses the options open to the injured victim or state).
154. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 32.
155. Sanctions Constraining Dplomats, supra note 153, at 255.
156. [1930] 1 K.B. 376 (1930).
157. Id at 380.
158. Sanctions Constraining Dilomats, supra note 153, at 268.
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nity by the sending state:5 9
Diplomatic privilege does not import immunity from legal liabil-
ity, but only exemption from local jurisdiction. The privilege is
the privilege of the Sovereign by whom the diplomatic agent is
accredited, and it may be waived with the sanction of the Sover-
eign or of the official superior of the agent. 1
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In United States v. Ariztii, 6 1 the defendant-diplomat relied upon dip-
lomatic immunity as a defense to criminal prosecution for conspir-
acy and violating the federal narcotics law. The diplomat's
government chose to waive his immunity, even though the diplomat
himself did not consent to the waiver.162 He was subsequently con-
victed. 163 The district court held that "the immunity is that of [de-
fendant's] government and is not personal to him. . . . His
government's waiver of diplomatic immunity. . . does not require
his consent."16
Although sending states do not generally waive a diplomat's
immunity from criminal prosecution, waiver may be granted when
subordinate members of a diplomatic mission are accused of com-
mitting a crime. In Rex v. A.B., 165 a United States Embassy clerk in
England was convicted of criminal charges when, prior to the crimi-
nal proceeding, the clerk was dismissed from his employment and
his immunity was waived by the United States. 166 Nevertheless, this
situation is the exception to the rule. For example, when a Dutch
Embassy vehicle struck and killed a man in Great Britain, the
Netherlands ambassador was asked to waive diplomatic immunity
of the driver. After consulting with the government, the ambassador
refused to waive the driver's immunity.
167
159. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 32(i), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 ("The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic
agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending
State.").
160. Dickinson v. Del Solar, [1930] 1 K.B. 376, 380, 142 L.T.R. (n.s.) 66, 66; see generally
Taylor v. Best, 14 C.B. 487 (1854).
161. 229 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
162. Immunity was waived because defendant was not engaged in any diplomatic func-
tion within the United States at the time of his offense. Id at 54.
163. Id at 55.
164. Id
165. [1941] 1 K.B. 454 (1941).
166. Id at 456.
167. 54 THE TIMES (London) 13 (May 23, 1958). If this same situation were to happen
today in the United States, the driver could be considered a member of the service staff and
therefore immune from criminal prosecution as long as the accident occurred while in the
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Some commentators recommend that immunity be waived in
criminal cases if the crime is punishable by local law and if the
courts of the country provide a fair forum. 168 However, a sending
state's refusal to waive immunity in these instances may insult the
receiving state, especially if the sending state bases refusal on the
claimed inability of local courts to provide a fair forum. 169 There-
fore, if the sending state will not waive immunity, it is recom-
mended that the state provide a fair forum for criminal prosecution
against the offending diplomat.
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Additional safeguards against abuses include recall, dismissal
or expulsion of the diplomat.'17 Article 9(1) of the Vienna Conven-
tion provides:
The receiving State may at any time and without having to ex-
plain its decision, notify the sending State that the head of the
mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission is
persona non grata or that any other member of the staff of the
mission is not acceptable. In any such case, the sending State
shall, as appropriate, either recall the person concerned or termi-
nate his functions with the mission. 72
If a diplomat habitually breaks the law, or if the offense with which
the individual is charged is serious, sufficient grounds exist for the
recall of the diplomat by the sending state. 73 Otherwise, the diplo-
mat runs the risk of being declared persona non grata. 174 The normal
procedure, however, is to report violations to the head of the diplo-
matic mission who, in turn, dismisses or transfers those diplomats
with numerous violations. 175
In theory, recall, dismissal and expulsion are effective sanctions
course of his official duties. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
art. 37(2), 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
168. Sanctions Constraining Diplomats, supra note 153, at 260-6 1.
169. Id
170. Id
171. 1d at 256.
172. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 9(1), 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
173. DEP'T OF STATE (1977), supra note 87, at 263; see also Sanctions Constraining Diplo-
mats, supra note 153, at 256-58, 263.
174. In international law and diplomatic usage, a persona non grata is "a person not
acceptable [for reasons peculiar to himself] to the court or government to which it is pro-
posed to accredit him in the character of an ambassador, or minister." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 1330 (4th ed. 1968).
175. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 90. A sending state often relocates diplomats who have
created adverse public attention because of abuses to receiving states. Id
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because they act as specific deterrents to gross infractions of the host
state's laws by diplomats, and they prevent repeated violations of
these laws by removing the offender from the country. 76 Practice
reveals, however, that sending states are reluctant to recall accused
diplomats and that receiving states are hesitant to dismiss or expel
diplomats unless the charges are serious.'
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Nevertheless, when a diplomat's actions threaten the safety and
security of a receiving state, it is serious enough to justify dismissal
or expulsion. State security takes precedence over a diplomat's im-
munity. 178 Therefore, the rules of immunity from arrest and deten-
tion can be circumvented when the diplomat's conduct threatens the
national security of the host state. 79
The importance of national security is not a new development
in diplomatic law. It is supported by Rose v. The King,180 a 1947
Canadian case involving an embassy employee who stole docu-
ments from the host embassy. The court permitted the diplomatic
employee to be prosecuted. One justice concluded:
Before granting or recognizing a privilege to another State, a
State has the right to accord to itself a first privilege, that of its
own security. To decide otherwise would be to grant a so-called
international rule of authority superior to the strict, rigid, and
necessary rule that the State, first and foremost, owes to its own
citizens . . . its own security.
The first duty of a diplomatic agent is to respect the security
of the state.' 81
In general, these sanctions indicate an overall effort by the re-
ceiving state to hold diplomats accountable for their conduct within
the state. The effectiveness of these sanctions, however, depends
upon proper enforcement by the State Department. The State De-
partment should handle disputes expeditiously by directly resolving
them with the respective embassies and their sending states. 8 2 Fi-
176. Sanctions Constraining Diplomats, supra note 153, at 257.
177. DEP'T OF STATE (1977), supra note 87, at 263; see also Sanctions Constraining Diplo-
mats, supra note 153, at 256.
178. C. WILSON, supra note 7, at 83-86.
179. Id.
180. 2 Can. C.R. 107, 3 D.L.R. 618 (1947) (Bissonnette, J., translation).
181. Id at 165, 3 D.L.R. at 646.
182. For example, the British Embassy has a policy of always paying their traffic fines.
An Embassy spokesman said: "We have a strict rule, no one is to claim diplomatic immu-
nity." Gupte, Privilegesfor Diplomats in U.S. Stir Resentment and May be Curbed, N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1978, § II, at B8, col. 4.
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nally, assistance by the diplomats themselves is essential if the
abuses of diplomatic privileges and immunities are to be curtailed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 is the sole embodiment
of diplomatic law in the United States. According to the Act, a dip-
lomatic agent is still immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving state. The Act takes major steps, however, to limit the
classes of diplomatic personnel accorded immunity. Only those per-
sons integral to the efficient functioning of the diplomatic mission-
diplomatic agents, administrative personnel and technical staffs-
are granted full immunity from criminal prosecution. In addition,
through its mandatory automobile insurance and direct action pro-
visions, the Act provides necessary redress to those most often in-
jured by diplomats.
In general, the Act is a monumental step toward holding diplo-
mats accountable for their activities within the United States. Nev-
ertheless, it is not without criticism. Even though the Act limits
those who may claim immunity from criminal prosecution, it still
enables eligible diplomats to violate local laws without any fear of
legal consequences. The justification for this extension of immunity
to criminal conduct is that if a diplomat is forced to defend himself
in court he cannot function efficiently. It seems absurd to hold that
a diplomat cannot function efficiently unless prohibited from being
prosecuted for violating local laws or permitted to engage in activi-
ties that harm others. Criminal offenses committed by a diplomat
do not further the efficient functioning of a diplomatic mission-
rarely is it within the legitimate scope of a diplomat's duties to break
criminal laws or injure citizens.
The Act attempts to narrow the scope and class of diplomats
protected. The Act has failed, however, to narrowly draw these
classes and their scope of protection. By further limiting the scope
of protection to only those acts performed in the course of a diplo-
mat's official duties, abuses by diplomats can be substantially re-
duced. Although it may be difficult to define the scope of "official
duties," once such a defintion is forged, diplomats will be on notice
that certain acts that violate the laws of the receiving state may be
actionable. Prosecuting a diplomat for committing serious criminal
offenses may interfere with the efficient functioning of that member
within the diplomatic mission, but diplomatic immunity is designed
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to protect the mission as a whole rather than its individual members.
The individual may be replacable without seriously impeding the
diplomatic mission. If prosecution is overly extensive and subjects
United States diplomats abroad to undue reciprocal hazards, the
State Department can, at a minimum, expel an offending foreign
diplomat and force the sending state to recall him immediately or
waive his immunity.
Over the years, abuse of diplomatic status, especially with re-
gard to traffic violations and traffic accidents, has created severe
public resentment. The mandatory insurance and direct action pro-
visions that attempt to subdue this resentment are inadequate. At a
minimum, higher mandatory insurance requirements are necessary.
In addition, the sending state should take responsibility for paying
any amount above and beyond the policy limits of the insurer.
Diplomatic immunity may be necessary, but to extend it with-
out regard to the rights of those injured in the receiving state is un-
justified. Abuses must be curtailed; such curtailment must begin
with both the diplomat's individual compliance with local laws, and
the sending state's efficient policing of its own diplomats abroad.
Without these two safeguards, more severe and intrusive steps may
be necessary to protect citizens of the receiving state, even if at the
expense of the diplomat.
Robert A. Wilson
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